The recent elections in the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Administration, marked by significant voter turnout and shifting party dynamics, hold critical implications for Turkey’s security strategy and regional stability amid ongoing tensions.
The transcript features an interview with Haydar Oruç discussing the recent elections in the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Administration, held on October 20, which saw increased voter turnout but mixed results for political parties. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) maintained its status as the leading party, while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (KYB) underperformed expectations. Oruç highlights the elections’ implications for Turkey, particularly concerning security threats posed by the PKK in Northern Iraq and the region’s political dynamics. He emphasizes the importance of Turkey’s relations with the KDP and the necessity for the Erbil administration to adopt a more proactive stance against the PKK to ensure regional stability and security.
Here’s a polished English translation of the transcript of the discussion regarding the Iraqi Regional Kurdish Administration elections and the implications for Turkey:
Hello, and welcome to “TAV Hızlı Bakış.” Our guest today is researcher, author, and columnist for “Diriliş Postası,” Haydar Oruç. Welcome, Mr. Oruç. Good evening.
Hello, Fatih Hodja. It’s good to be here. Today, we are addressing an important agenda. The recent elections held in the Iraqi Regional Kurdish Administration have become a significant topic in Turkey. We decided to create a video on this issue, and I appreciate Mr. Haydar for joining us. Without further ado, I would like to ask: how do you evaluate the elections in general?
The recent elections in the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Administration have attracted significant attention in Turkey.
When we examine these elections, we must recognize that everything occurring in the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Administration closely concerns us. Developments regarding our security, particularly in Northern Iraq and Northern Syria, are critical, especially in terms of who gains power in a parliamentary election and who will govern. These issues require our close attention.
These elections were initially scheduled for 2022 but were delayed by two years and underwent four changes. Therefore, it’s essential to monitor and follow these elections closely. However, as you mentioned, due to a busy agenda, these elections were somewhat overlooked. But let’s fill that gap. The elections were held on October 20. Overall, they were successful. Participation rates were quite high compared to 2018, increasing from 59% to around 72%. Approximately 2.6 million voters made choices about their governance.
Initially scheduled for 2022, these elections were postponed for two years and underwent four modifications.
There were some changes compared to the previous election, which I’ll briefly summarize before discussing expectations. The parliament in this autonomous region of Iraq operates under the federal constitution and consists of 111 seats, with 10 allocated for minorities, including Turkmen, Christians, and Armenians. A single region-wide election was conducted. However, due to disputes between the KDP and KYB, and previous court cases regarding the elections, the federal court initially lifted the minority quota and later reduced it to 5. It ruled that elections would not be held as a single region but instead divided into four regions: Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok, and Halabja, determining seat allocations accordingly.
The election results met some expectations while contradicting others. For example, from the KDP’s perspective, they anticipated a victory and emerged as the leading party, winning 39 seats. However, the KYB expected to increase their votes and seats in this election, partly due to support from Iran, the Iraqi central government, and the United States, which led to a belief that the public would favor the KYB more. However, the results showed otherwise.
Let me summarize the seats won by each party before we continue. In the 100-seat parliament, the KDP won 39 seats, the KYB won 23, the New Generation Movement won 15, the Kurdistan Islamic Union won 7, the Kurdish Democratic Movement won 4, the Kurdistan Justice Society (Komel) won 3, the People’s Front won 2, the Kurdistan Alliance Group won 1, and the Goran Movement won 1 seat. The KDP and KYB maintained their positions as the first and second parties. However, the election’s real surprise was the Goran Party, which previously held 3 seats and managed to win just one seat, almost losing its representation. Meanwhile, the New Generation Movement, formed by former KYB members who opposed the party, made a surprising entry by increasing their representation from 8 to 15 seats.
The KDP became the dominant party, necessitating the formation of a government led by them.
Overall, we can say that the election mirrored the previous one, with only three parties changing. The KDP emerged as the leading party, and a government must be formed under KDP leadership. Previously, the KDP and KYB had a partnership in the government. However, before the election, we noticed some statements indicating that both parties should be involved in the process, as the KDP and KYB began to express their positions more openly. It seems they are expecting a government that includes both parties.
As you pointed out, the results of these elections will significantly affect Turkey. There was a high expectation that the KYB would perform better, and if that scenario had materialized, it would have posed a problem for Turkey. What do you think?
Had the KYB strengthened, particularly as a unified party, Turkey might have overlooked warnings and persisted in its cooperation with the PKK.
The HB is strong in Sulaymaniyah, and previous visits from Turkey, especially by our Foreign Minister Mr. Hakan Fidan and even the President a few months ago, conveyed warnings to both the central government and the KYB regarding this issue. There were intelligence reports indicating that the PKK terrorist organization was trying to establish itself in the region and gain legitimacy. The KYB was warned to prevent this, but despite these warnings, they maintained their relationships with the PKK in Northern Iraq and the YPG in Northern Syria. They are also trying to leverage these relationships to influence the Baghdad government through Iran and create a space for themselves.
If the scenario you mentioned had occurred, it would have posed a significant problem for us. Turkey has long been conducting operations in Northern Iraq to neutralize the PKK presence and eliminate it. Our President’s statement about the imminent completion of operations reflects this urgency. We believe there isn’t much time left to eliminate this presence. If the KYB had gained strength, especially emerging as a single party, it could have led Turkey to overlook warnings and continue collaborating with the PKK, supported by Iran, possibly Baghdad, and the U.S. But that did not happen.
At present, the Erbil administration, especially the KDP, maintains a good relationship with Turkey.
In the end, the KDP continued as the leading party, and if we consider the new government, it is likely to be dominated by the KDP. The KDP needs to draw a conclusion from this: they must recognize that there is no public support for an alliance with the PKK that opposes Turkey, and forming a strategy against Turkey in this region is no longer feasible. Recently, both our Foreign Minister and Defense Minister have delivered very clear messages. If the KYB ignores our warnings and continues down this path, we will take necessary actions. I hope Talabani received this message and will act accordingly in the future.
I have previously written about Iraq in general, assessing Turkey’s Iraq policy through several factors: securing Turkey’s southern borders, maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, and ensuring that no terrorist activities originating from Iraq threaten Turkey’s security. I believe that these three criteria shape Turkey’s Iraq policy.
Now, looking at the recent elections, do you think the results will lead to any changes in the Erbil administration’s perspective toward Turkey, especially considering the current regional tensions, such as the Israel-Palestine conflict and Iran’s issues with Israel? Do you foresee any changes in how the Erbil administration views Turkey?
Before the election, you may recall that the leader of the KYB, Nechirvan Barzani, visited Turkey and met with our President. During that meeting, they emphasized that Turkey’s presence in Northern Iraq is not against them but rather a fight against the PKK. Turkey has made it clear that its presence there does not threaten the Erbil administration or the Baghdad government. On the contrary, Turkey is there to ensure its own safety and has repeatedly affirmed its respect for Iraq’s territorial integrity.
There is no prospect of any backtracking on this issue, and even the development of the “Road to Development” project relates to enhancing security and economic relations between the two countries. This project continues to progress. However, concerning potential threats Turkey might perceive from Northern Iraq, given past attacks launched from Qandil, it is reasonable for Turkey to seek to secure this corridor, especially since there is an ongoing acute threat in Northern Syria. Thus, Turkey’s approach is to compartmentalize the threat by first addressing Northern Iraq and then Syria, ensuring the threat does not persist. To do this, Turkey aims to resolve issues here and anticipates cooperation from the Baghdad central government.
As you know, the PKK has been designated a terrorist organization and is not recognized as a legal entity, but it’s significant that this designation has begun addressing the PKK’s status. The Iraqi central government has issued guidelines on how to refer to and write about the organization.
We haven’t encountered many problems with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), despite tensions following the independence referendum in 2017. Although Turkey’s investments and projects in the region were halted during that time, they have recognized their mistakes and taken steps to mend relations with Turkey. Currently, the Erbil administration, particularly the KDP, has no issues with Turkey. They maintain a unified stance against the PKK.
While we may expect them to take more concrete actions against the PKK, this is limited by the resources available to the KDP peshmerga forces. Beyond that, they rely on Turkey’s support. However, as you mentioned, the KYB has historically taken a different approach compared to the KDP, cooperating with the terrorist organization to destabilize Turkey and initiate new regional arrangements. They have initiated various attacks on neighboring countries, including occupation policies, massacres, and genocidal actions. While these actions may not seem directly related…
