by Maan Al-Bayari*
It is absolutely true that the signing of 17 agreements between Turkey and Egypt, during President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s visit to Ankara the day before yesterday, Thursday, reflects an advanced momentum in the path of relations that are steadily improving between the two countries. However, this does not hide the fact that the scope of political understandings between them is still narrow, or perhaps more precisely that the scope of disagreements between them in other than regional files is still wide. At the same time, there is a lesson that we must be convinced of, which these ambiguous relations between the two great countries give us, the gist of which is that countries can set aside areas of disagreement, or sometimes sharp conflict, from the benefits and interests between them, and give the latter two priority in their deliberations. These statements by the two presidents, Sisi and Erdogan, during the visit, insist on “strengthening relations” and the importance of “coordination and cooperation,” especially since there is a strategic cooperation council between the two countries that was reconstituted during the Turkish president’s visit to Cairo last February, which Sisi’s visit appears to be a continuation of. However, the statements seem protocolary, if we ignore the significant progress in the economic agreements that included several sectors, including energy, communications, and health, and which aim, essentially, to raise the annual trade volume from ten billion dollars to 15 billion. This is because, with the exception of the “agreement” to demand that the two presidents immediately cease fire in Gaza, which seems superfluous, if not useless, no agreement was announced in the two presidents’ discussions regarding the explosive files, such as Libya, the maritime borders, and Somalia, for example.
Despite its relative openness to the Libyan (interim) “Government of National Unity”, headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, in Tripoli, with which it has signed 13 cooperation agreements (including activating the electricity connection), Cairo continues to support Khalifa Haftar’s entities in eastern Libya, and has not stopped providing him with military (and political) support, including receiving the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa Madbouly, the head of the eastern government, assigned by the House of Representatives, which is loyal to Haftar, Osama Hammad. This is while news has continued about intensive and active military movements by Haftar’s forces towards the southwest of the country, while forces affiliated with the Dbeibah government have mobilized in anticipation, in parallel with news of Turkish military movements in the west, with the Tripoli government forces being reinforced with new Turkish equipment. It does not appear that Sisi and Erdogan’s words, in their joint press conference, about removing foreign militias from Libya decide anything.
With intermittent talks between Ankara and Cairo on “re-demarcating” the maritime borders, after the gap between them widened following Egypt’s signing of an agreement with (Northern) Cyprus and Greece to establish the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, and the demarcation of the maritime borders with Greece in 2020 (which experts said infringes on Egyptian rights?), it does not appear that this “mined” file in the improving Egyptian-Turkish relations is on its way to a solution, in which Ankara will leave behind its deep annoyance at what it had considered an Egyptian “provocation.”
The scrutinizer of the details of the talks between the two sides, during the important visit, did not find that Cairo was benefited from relations with Ethiopia, which is a top priority for decision-makers in Ankara, not only considering that two hundred Turkish companies are active in many sectors in this country, but also considering Turkey’s geostrategic calculations in Africa, driven by major economic benefits. Egypt’s recent sending of weapons and equipment to Somalia, amidst an atmosphere of escalating tension in the two countries’ relations with Ethiopia, which opened an embassy for itself in “Somaliland”, raises questions about possible “frictions” in Somali territory with Turkey, which took the initiative to attempt mediation between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, after it had signed agreements to demarcate the presence of Turkish forces, land and sea, in Somalia.
… It is political pragmatism at its most extreme, when protocol niceties conceal differences that are not secret, and when mutual economic benefits are the top priority, and one of the perceived benefits of which is that it may extinguish any potential tensions that are likely to be caused by remaining “mines.” These are some of the lessons that are evident in Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s visit to Ankara.
*Mr. Al-Bayari is the head editor of Al Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, based in Qatar.
This article was auto translated from https://www.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%85
