Today’s TAV Quick Look features researcher Ahmet Arda Şensoy discussing the reported death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. While Israeli sources claim his martyrdom, Hamas remains silent. Sinwar’s demise could impact ceasefire talks and regional stability, but Hamas is expected to continue its resistance. The situation also raises concerns about potential conflicts involving Iran, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.
Hello and welcome to TAV Quick Look. Our guest today is TAV researcher Ahmet Arda Şensoy. Ahmet and I will discuss the martyrdom of Yahya Sinwar. Although Hamas has not fully acknowledged this, Israeli sources and most international media outlets have started to report that Yahya Sinwar was martyred. We are going to explore this topic with Ahmet.
I would like to pose my questions to Arda about this issue without wasting too much time. How do you assess the initial reactions in general? What can we make of this situation? What is the impact on Hamas? How do you evaluate this situation?
Of course, Yahya Sinwar was elected as the leader of Hamas after his assassination, and that’s important to note. Some say this attack occurred today, while others say it happened yesterday, which should also be emphasized. As you mentioned, Israel has confirmed it, but Hamas has not yet made an official statement.
If we analyze the attack and the situation, Yahya Sinwar achieved a death and martyrdom that were parallel to his life. He was a warrior leader with a military background; he died fighting, not hiding in tunnels. The reason for emphasizing this is that it was claimed he was always in the tunnels with the hostages taken on October 7th. This point is highlighted. Therefore, it was said that this is why Israel could not hit him. However, we might conclude from this incident that this is not the case.
Yahya Sinwar was born in a refugee camp in Khan Younis, south of Gaza. He was in Israeli prisons from 2008 to 2021, which is a very long time. As we all know, he was released in the exchange deal where more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners were released in exchange for Gilad Shalit. After 2017, he became the head of Hamas in Gaza. He was actually a bridge between Hamas’s military wing and its political leadership.
After Sinwar’s martyrdom, he was unanimously appointed as the new leader of Hamas. The initial reactions were varied. For example, when we look at Netanyahu’s comments, he called on Hamas to surrender. In his own way, we can say that Netanyahu was trying to present a victory to his domestic audience and the West.
At this stage, Biden is taking a similar approach. In his statements, he said that in a Gaza without Hamas in power, a political solution is now possible—one that will ensure a better future for both Israelis and Palestinians. After Sinwar’s assassination, he claimed that Yahya Sinwar was the biggest obstacle to achieving these goals, and now that obstacle is gone, meaning Hamas no longer has the capacity to carry out an attack like the one on October 7th.
These statements are interesting. To put it another way, Sinwar was asserting that the organizers of October 7th would never attempt such an act again. The fact that Israel has been bombing Gaza for a year under this pretext, and that the incident in which Sinwar was martyred took the form of a clash, perhaps inadvertently, indicates that this excuse of theirs is somewhat hollow.
Finally, regarding how Hamas might be affected by this, while Yahya Sinwar was a crucial leader, I don’t believe that Hamas will be significantly impacted. Regardless of what happens, Hamas is a resistance movement and a national struggle movement. It is a group engaged in a national struggle and is very likely to produce a new leader and continue from where it left off. Therefore, we are talking about a group that is not based solely on leadership, but more on ideology and acting within the framework of an ideal. Of course, Sinwar’s experience and charismatic leadership will be missed.
However, I believe that this gap can be filled from within Hamas over time. After your points, many questions come to mind. One is whether there was a weakness in intelligence regarding Sinwar’s replacement. Particularly regarding the assassinations of Ismail Hani in Iran and the attack on Nasrallah in Lebanon, there seems to be a suspicion of an intelligence weakness. Of course, we will probably never have clear information about how this incident will unfold or how it happened.
What impact will this have on the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? First of all, regarding the intelligence failure, yes, that may have occurred. But the difference here is that in the attack where Sinwar was martyred, we witnessed an assassination in Tehran, the capital of Iran, within a Revolutionary Guards’ guest house. It happened in the heart of Iran.
We also saw the assassination attempt on Nasrallah during an attack on underground tunnels. When we consider these attacks on Hezbollah, including the destruction of communication devices, we understand that there is a serious intelligence network or infiltration within Iran and Hezbollah. Yet, Israel has not been able to establish the same infiltration within Hamas in Gaza, which it has blockaded for nearly 20 years and regularly attacks. So, yes, there may have been an intelligence weakness or a different situation in this particular incident. However, in a broader context, I believe there is a significant difference in intelligence weaknesses between Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran and its affiliated groups.
Let’s set that aside. Considering the impact of the crisis on the future, as I mentioned earlier, Israel has been attempting a genocide in Gaza for a year, using Sinwar and Hamas as pretexts. In fact, we argue that this is just a pretext. However, this is how it is presented in their own statements. Therefore, if a rational actor were demonstrating internal consistency, under these conditions, one would expect a certain response.
Just as Biden claimed, if Sinwar was indeed the biggest obstacle to a ceasefire or an end to the war, that obstacle is now gone. We may have to wait for a ceasefire, or the US may say, “You have achieved your goal; you have killed Sinwar, let’s have a ceasefire,” and Netanyahu could be persuaded. But of course, that’s not going to happen; expecting that would be ridiculous and naive. Thus, we can only say that this is one of the countless lies that have been told over the past year, attempting to show inconsistency as proof that Sinwar was not a cause, that he did not pose a problem, and that he was actually occupying Gaza.
This is no longer limited to this case; it is evident to everyone except those who refuse to see it. Finally, when we consider Netanyahu’s goals in invading Gaza, it was to eliminate Hamas, prevent missile attacks on Israel, and recover hostages. He has not finished Hamas. Even though there are attacks inside Israel, which may be at a much lower level than in Gaza, Israel is now in a situation where, since October 7th, it is even more vulnerable than before. In other words, Iran can now attack Israel.
Moreover, Israel was unable to retrieve the hostages. So in short, this is a war that it cannot win on a strategic level. If we focus on Netanyahu’s and Israel’s inability to eliminate Hamas, the question becomes: Who will rule Gaza?
Yes, Israel has attempted genocide in Gaza. It is continuing its occupation. However, Israel lacks the economic and demographic capacity to sustain that occupation in the long term. There were Israeli settlements in Gaza before 2005, but if you recall, Israel evacuated them after that year. Therefore, a similar cyclical pattern may re-emerge. The point is that Israel may have to leave Gaza and once again cede control to Hamas. Because Israel does not desire this, it seems to be trapped in a continuous cycle. If we consider why Hamas cannot be eradicated, again, as I mentioned, it is because Hamas is not an organization supported by just a part of the population in Palestine or Gaza, but a part of a broader Palestinian cause or national struggle that encompasses the entire population. Thus, Hamas will likely continue as long as the Palestinian population exists. The elimination of Hamas appears impossible from this perspective.
Lastly, it’s possible that this incident could lead to a fracture within Hamas. It might create an interesting scenario regarding Hamas’s methodological direction and future actions. The conflict in Gaza may continue, albeit with difficulty, and there is already discussion about whether it will spread to the West Bank. However, we might witness a shift towards different methods within Hamas. For instance, there could be a return to more fortified actions, with the possibility of carrying out such actions worldwide. This could create a significant situation. After all, this is reminiscent of Cold War-era tactics. Although such methods fell out of practice later, we might observe something similar, potentially resulting in a situation where all Zionists are under threat globally. Let’s see how it unfolds.
This was a very detailed and insightful evaluation. There may be some answers to my three questions within this discussion, but we have recently started to talk about how the threat posed by Israel is beginning to impact Turkey in a sense. What do you think in a regional context? Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly following the assassination of Sinwar, and the situation with Nasrallah and Hezbollah, what could be the regional implications of this conflict and tension? We also have significant issues in Syria to consider. I would appreciate your brief thoughts on this matter.
Regionally, the focus is actually on Israel’s attacks on Lebanon, its possible attacks on Syria, and Israeli expansionism in general. The critical question here is whether an Iran-Israel regional war will break out. We can say this: Iran, if it did not respond seriously to the assassination of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, cannot be expected to engage in a war. The sensitivities and balances for Iran in this respect are quite different.
For Iran and the groups we refer to as the resistance axis, the issue of Yahya Sinwar or Gaza is much more valuable as propaganda material. Iran is expected to
utilize this for propaganda purposes, and this is normal. However, even if Iran makes statements regarding this situation, it is unlikely to take on the practical costs associated with military engagement. In Israel, there are already rumors that Netanyahu is hoping for Trump to win the next U.S. election. It appears that he is playing toward that direction. In the context of a regional war, actions may be taken that would favor Trump’s victory.
There are also reports suggesting that an order was given to strike Iran before the American presidential elections. However, the Biden administration has reached a point where it is competing with Trump for support regarding Israel, particularly to bolster Kamala Harris’s election chances. This can be seen in the dispatch of American air defense systems and troops to Israel. It reflects not only support for Trump or Israel but also a competition to see who can demonstrate stronger Zionist support.
Netanyahu continues to exploit this situation, despite being in a difficult position domestically, and he seems to be dragging the entire region toward war with U.S. support. Unfortunately, as you noted, Israel carries risks of conflict spreading to Lebanon and even Syria. I would say that these tensions are still very active.
Thank you very much. We will continue to evaluate this issue from different perspectives because I believe this conflict will remain on our agenda for a long time. Our guest today on TAV Quick Look was TAV researcher Ahmet Arda Şensoy. We thank him for his insights.
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