Turkey’s normalization negotiations with Syria stand apart from Gulf and EU approaches, as Turkey prioritizes addressing national security risks and leveraging its influence over Assad, while others focus on limiting the conflict’s spillover effects.
The ongoing Syrian civil war has spurred varied normalization efforts with Assad: Gulf and EU countries aim to contain the conflict’s regional repercussions, while Turkey’s strategy focuses on pressing Assad to address critical security concerns, such as PKK/YPG terrorism and border stability. Turkey wields considerable leverage, but Assad’s reliance on Russian and Iranian support, along with his ties to the YPG, complicate negotiations. For Turkey, progress hinges on Assad’s actions against terrorism, making this a unique and challenging normalization effort compared to others in the region.
The Syrian civil war, now in its 14th year, has seen many countries cut diplomatic ties with Damascus due to the Assad administration’s harsh crackdowns and mass atrocities against protesters, isolating the regime on the global stage. During the Obama administration, the U.S.’s relative indifference, along with the allowance of Iranian-backed Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah forces into Syria under the nuclear agreement, followed by Russia’s pro-Assad intervention in 2015, created conditions for Assad’s survival. Reflecting this, diplomatic normalization with Assad began: the United Arab Emirates resumed relations in 2018, Jordan followed in 2021, and the Arab League accepted Syria back into the fold in 2023.
Turkey, meanwhile, announced intentions to engage in normalization talks with Damascus, bringing this issue to the forefront, with Bashar Assad’s statements and media coverage keeping the matter in focus. Recently, eight EU members—Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, and Slovenia—have called for a reset in EU policy, urging negotiations with Assad regarding the return of Syrian refugees.
This analysis will examine the converging and diverging points among these three normalization trends with Assad, the demands placed on the regime, and the motivations and capacity of Assad to meet them. This discussion will shed light on the future of normalization efforts with Assad and Turkey’s role.
Three Different Normalization Paths
Following Syria’s re-entry to the Arab League in 2023, Gulf countries completed diplomatic normalization. The next anticipated steps involved Gulf investment in Syria’s reconstruction, contingent on Assad’s meeting specific requirements. However, little progress has been made on issues the Gulf states demanded, such as combating the Captagon drug trade, securing borders, and, for Jordan, enabling refugee returns. On the contrary, drug seizures have increased, and Jordan, instead of sending refugees back, had to conduct air operations in Syria due to security concerns. Apart from Jordan, Gulf nations seem relatively unperturbed, as their goal was to localize the Syrian conflict and mitigate security threats.
Some EU nations’ calls for a new approach to Syria resemble the Gulf’s stance. These EU countries, facing refugee flows or acting as transit points, are trying to find a solution to this unresolved issue. However, since these countries lack direct borders with Syria, their goal, like the Gulf’s, centers on containing the Syrian conflict’s effects.
Turkey’s normalization talks with Assad differ fundamentally. Turkey faces distinct threats and opportunities due to its military operations, support for opposition groups, and proximity to the Idlib refugee crisis and PKK/YPG terrorism. As the only country with significant influence over the Assad regime and its allies, Iran and Russia, Turkey holds substantial leverage, controlling regions and supporting groups opposed to Assad. Most critically, Turkey retains the right to operate militarily in Syria, targeting PKK/YPG threats.
Despite Turkey’s strong position, the Assad regime, backed by Russia and Iran, perceives itself as negotiating from a position of strength. Assad has even labeled Turkey’s military presence as occupation and demanded reparations for its support of “terrorists.” Though not voiced as aggressively, the regime’s maximalist stance is likely to persist in negotiations. Recent attacks by regime forces on Turkish bases in Idlib indicate the regime’s intent to pressure Turkey on the ground ahead of formal talks.
The Assad Regime’s Capacity and Intentions
Turkey’s primary demands from Assad are straightforward: combat PKK/YPG terrorism, facilitate Syrian refugee returns, and initiate a political solution process.
The Assad regime’s capacity to combat PKK/YPG terrorism, however, is limited. The regime relies heavily on Russian-supported troops and Iranian-commanded militias for military operations, necessitating Iran and Russia’s alignment with Turkey’s anti-terror demands. Moreover, Assad lacks motivation to confront the YPG, given the mutual benefits of their long-standing cooperation. The YPG, controlling oil-rich areas east of the Euphrates, supplies oil to Assad’s regime, circumventing international embargoes. Breaking this dependency requires more than mere negotiations.
There is also the risk that Assad and Russia could use normalization with Turkey as leverage over the YPG, pushing for arrangements where the YPG gains autonomy while remaining non-threatening to the regime. If U.S. forces eventually withdraw, as projected under a potential Trump presidency, the YPG might seek cooperation with Assad as a buffer against Turkish offensives. Turkey’s normalization efforts, even if inconclusive, could help delay such a convergence between Assad and the YPG.
Conclusion and Recommendations
For genuine progress, Assad must address Turkey’s concerns, but his military limitations, fragile state structure, economic crises, and reliance on Russia and Iran make this unlikely. For Turkey, key conditions include halting attacks on Idlib, ending the PKK/YPG presence in areas like Tel Rifaat and Manbij, and demonstrating a commitment to countering terrorism. Without these, Assad’s willingness to enable refugee returns or initiate political reforms appears doubtful.
Ultimately, unlike previous dialogues with other regional powers, Turkey’s engagement with Assad hinges on counterterrorism and border security—issues critical to its national security. The Gulf and EU’s focus on conflict containment diverges significantly from Turkey’s objectives. For Turkey, a lasting solution lies in its military strategies in Syria since 2016, targeting terrorism at its source. The path forward depends on whether Assad aligns with Ankara’s approach, a challenging but essential condition for Turkey’s security interests.
