By Sinan Hatahet*
Anti-Syrian events erupting in Kayseri and then spreading other cities should be analyzed with all aspects so that a permanent solution can be found before it is not too late.
My opinion about latest incidents is as follows;
1. There is no denying that foreign actors, whether the West, PKK or any other, would benefit from any rift between Turks and their neighbours. However, blaming or accusing them of triggering the latest events ignores the blatant governance and cultural structural problems and failures.
2. There are nearly 4 million refugees in Turkey. They are concentrated primarily in Urban centres to ensure their livelihoods. They also live in communities; most come with their families. Sticking together creates a support system that is not available otherwise.
3. The motivations for their stay in Turkey are diverse.
a. Some came for political reasons, fleeing persecution. Their return to their homeland is conditioned by the end of Assad’s rule. They are the smallest group in size, but they are the most influential among Syrians, and they have no financial dependencies on the Turkish state.
b. Others came for security reasons. They are not necessarily fleeing personal persecution, but their hometowns were either destroyed or living in them would endanger their physical security. They represent nearly 40% of the Syrian population in Turkey, mainly from Northern Syria (Idlib, Aleppo, Raqa and Hassaka), central Syria (Homs and Hama) and Eastern Syria (Deir Ezzor). Their social and economic classes are diverse and represent their original composition at home. A small percentage is wealthy (they created their own business in manufacturing and trade), the middle class from Urban centres (they sought white collar jobs, some established small shops, some created service companies in IT, marketing, tourism and real estate), and the workers class from rural areas (they sought work in factories and agricultural lands). Their return to their hometown is conditioned by the re-establishment of security and the creation of work opportunities.
c. The last group came for financial reasons. They came to seek work opportunities or to join other family members. They are as large as the second group in socioeconomic composition—the creation of jobs conditions their return to home.
4. It is essential to note that their return to home becomes more complex as time passes.
5. The Turkish state institutions, bureaucracy and government have no experience in hosting non-Turkic refugees or immigrants. To this day, there is a lack of a comprehensive policy to deal with the phenomena. The legal framework doesn’t offer a sustainable solution in the long run. The path and conditions for obtaining work permits are rigid; at the time of appeasement, it was made more accessible by non-official directives and exceptions but was never transformed into a sustainable system. There is no path to obtaining legal status for refugees, which, by the way, could impose financial participation on the international community if negotiated correctly. There is no path for obtaining long-stay residency permits.
6. The AKP government attempted to partially solve this issue by granting exceptional citizenship to Syrian refugees, mainly businessmen, scholars, influential people, and university students. This solution did not only irritate the opposition and the local populace, but it also didn’t solve the structural problem of the legal residence of Syrians. There is a law that is good for applying for citizenship. There was no need to grant exceptions beyond a minimal number, and it would have been more efficient and acceptable to maintain the original conditions for citizenship with a better, more robust and sustainable legal framework for residency.
7. The Turkish identity problem concerns the first generation and the working classes. The first generation naturally resists cultural adaptation. They are attached to their identity and their cultures. However, their influence on the second generation is balanced by the influence of the larger society and host communities, which is strong even in “Syrian Ghettos.” The working class is not as resistant to change as much, but they live in poor host communities with limited cultural influence.
8. We have to recognise that the nationalistic political discourse in Turkey is alienating this second generation and could potentially create a reversal of social integration and assimilation natural dynamics. We have witnessed how these politics have created social anomalies in Europe; second and third-generation immigrants felt like social pariahs, never were able to hang on to their parent’s identity, and were lost. The result was devastating: a life of crime, drugs, and eventually ISIS.
9. The current government policy of exercising maximum pressure on Syrian presence would only succeed in two things:
a. The wealthy and middle-class Syrians will leave Turkey for Europe, Egypt, or the GCC.
b. The poor will live in an illegal status and will keep trying to flee to Europe. He will lose any consideration for laws and rules beyond what his conscience dictates.
They will not leave it as friends but as people with a bitter experience. The just among them will refrain from bad-mouthing Turkey, and the vengeful among them will attack Turkey in every way possible. Most importantly, Turkey would lose all the Syrians who fed themselves, some of whom contribute to the country’s GDP and creation of employment and who can play a positive role in helping the less fortunate Syrians in Turkey.
10. Syrian communities equally share the burden and responsibilities of the current state of affairs. The lack of thought leaders, large organisations, and efficient coordinating bodies contribute to how badly the Syrians’ living conditions have evolved. However, the lack of structure nullifies all their best attempts and intentions to make a difference.
11. Kayseri incidents are not the first of their kind in Turkey. Other cases have happened in Gaziantep and Ankara before. In the aftermath of the earthquake, many discriminatory incidents by the local population and the state were observed against Syrians (only some of them were reported, thanks to the efforts of Syrian activists who did not want to create pressure on the government before the elections). The slightest problem that requires the intervention of the Turkish authorities, such as banal traffic incidents, triggers the deportation of the Syrian involved. The Turkish law reinforcement bodies (besides courts) systematically discriminate against Syrians. The result is simple: total loss of trust in the Turkish state institutions among Syrians, including the ones who received the citizenship.
In Syria:
1. The Turkish military intervention has undeniably consolidated an Assad-free zone in the north and stopped the regime from regaining the whole territory. The front lines have frozen since its deal with Russia in March 2020, and normalcy has somehow been reestablished.
2. Regardless of the political and security reasons that pushed Turkey to intervene (all Syrians understand them very well), the sense of loyalty and gratefulness was significantly high among the local communities at home and abroad.
3. A close examination of the Turkish intervention in the other sectors of northern Syria demonstrates the following:
a. The Turkish decentralisation governance model was exported as is. However, if this model works efficiently in Turkey, it is because Ankara has strategic minds orchestrating the locals. In Syria, Turkey not only failed to create a coordinating centre but actually combated the attempts made by Syrians.
b. The Ministry of Interior is theoretically in charge on the ground. Still, it shares the same ecosystem with the MIT (which handles relations with Syrian armed groups) and the TSK (which assumes a physical presence on the ground). The result is a mesh of conflictual policies, which often deal with the same people (reinforcers).
c. A lot of effort is put into making northern Syria function like Turkey (difficult and requires a generational approach), but none was put into understanding and conditioning the Syrian historical governance DNA. You cannot change a living mechanism without understanding it and evolving it with a gradual approach.
4. Turkish bureaucrats, statesmen, politicians, and even workers perceive their Syrian counterparts as inferiors to their intellectuals. They have historical misconceptions of Syrians that have proven nearly impossible to change. We also must recognise that some Syrians have played these perceptions to gain access to influential decision-makers. They have perpetuated the slave and master dynamic to position themselves better.
5. As a result, Turkish decision-makers also look for followers who obey orders. They have no appetite to look for partners with whom they can maintain a healthy coordinating relationship despite having different views or opinions on some matters.
6. Again, like in Turkey, Syrians equally share the burden and responsibility of the current state of affairs. The lack of strong leadership, a visionary plan, and an exemplary governance model all contributed to the situation’s bad evolution.
7. The latest rapprochement attempts between Ankara and Damascus have not involved Syrians from the local communities, for which Turkey has assumed their security since 2018. If Turkey is in full right to revisit its position in regards to Assad at home, parts of their negotiation involve high stakes in northern Syria. While diplomatic efforts were spent in Ankara, Baghdad, Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus, negotiations were underway to open the international road connecting Turkey to Jordan through Syria. No Syrian from the opposition took part in the talks, and thus, no Syrians were found to advocate or defend what I think is a significant and crucial deal.
8. We must recognise that Syrians cannot be led only by good intentions. We need to convince and lobby them. The choice of whom we partner with to lead them is crucial. It is not whom we like that will succeed; it is whom the Syrians like that will succeed, and we need to empower them.
[2/7 13:06] Sinan Hatahet: Moving forward, here is my uncandid opinion on a sustainable and comprehensive roadmap:
1. The legal framework for residency permits should be completely revised. This will ensure an accessible legal pathway for Syrians to assume full responsibility, duties, and rights, thereby enhancing their integration into Turkish society. Removing the quota of 5 to 1 Turkish to the foreign workforce in a company for Syrians will open up more employment opportunities. Issuing long-stay residency permits and restoring Syrian rights in ownership, as proposed in Omer’s Mavi Cart, will provide stability and security to the Syrian refugees.
2. Stop all exceptional measures in dealing with Syrian presence on Turkish soil, including the issuing of citizenship.
3. It is crucial that we seek international funding to redistribute Syrian households. This support, coupled with incentives for national companies that employ Syrians and businessmen who relocate, will significantly contribute to the successful integration of Syrian refugees into Turkish society.
4. Empower local central coordination governance entities and train new Syrian bureaucracy.
5. Elect local representation in Syria.
6. Reinforce the Syrian Military Police (under the tutelage of the TSK) and gradually freeze and block the resources of armed groups.
7. Unite northern Aleppo with Idlib.
8. By removing bureaucratic hurdles and introducing financial infrastructure, we can foster the growth of the local private sector in northern Syria. This will not only create employment opportunities but also attract people back to the region. The coordination with the international community in this endeavor will ensure a robust and sustainable economic environment.
* Dr. Sinan Hatahet is a Syrian scholar decitating his life to the well-being of Syrian migrants. Hatahet is based in Istanbul
